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Abstract
Some products and services are perfect complements to technological de-
vices, such as video games to video game consoles. We analyze how com-
petition between two rms selling such devices is a¤ected by the fact that
they can retrieve revenue both from end-users and from rms selling com-
plementary products. We show that non-exclusive complementary products
weaken competition relative to when the products are exclusive. Furthermore,
competition is less keen when the device producers have ine¢ cient means for
retrieving revenue from the seller side, compared to when they have e¢ cient
means. Finally, we show that from the set of feasible strategies, the rms
will always choose the socially optimal one. A novel nding is that at the
consumer side there are brand specic adoption externalities also when the
complementary products are non-exclusive.
Keywords: System Economics, network e¤ects, R&D investments
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1 Introduction
In order to play video games, you need a video game console. Also other devices, such
as tablet computers, are often bought solely or primarily in order to consume comple-
mentary products. Consumers continuously demand new complementary products
for their devices. Furthermore, these devices are usually proprietary systems. Thus,
in sum, the consumers who have bought a given device represent an aftermarket for
complementary products, for which the producer of the device is a gatekeeper. A de-
vice producer can exploit this role directly by developing and selling complementary
products itself. However, inasmuch as there exist rms that specialize in serving
aftermarkets, the device producers often choose to sell o¤ the rights to develop and
sell the complementary products. This is the starting point of our paper.
When the aftermarkets are served by an independent seller, the sellers willing-
ness to pay for serving a consumer with complementary products will determine the
device producersincentive to capture consumers. Thus, when the value of a captive
consumer is high, the competition in the device market is tough, and vice versa. In
this paper we analyze how characteristics of the aftermarket, by determining the
value of a captive consumer, a¤ect the competition in the device market.
In order to do this, we build a two-stage model where two device producers
compete á lá Hotelling for the consumers by selling devices at stage 1. At stage
2, the device producers sell o¤ the rights to serve their captive consumers to a
rm which develops and sells complementary products. We impose the realistic
assumption that the more the seller invests in R&D when a product is developed,
the higher prot margin it obtains when it sells the product. We nd that compared
to when the products are exclusive, the competition is softer when the products
are non-exclusive. Furthermore, we nd that if there is an opportunity for the
device producers to retrieve rents from the seller by the use of two-part tari¤s, the
competition is intensied compared to when rents can be retrieved by per-unit-sold
royalty fees only. Our results are driven by how the value to a device producer of
capturing a marginal consumer is a¤ected by di¤erent product- and contract types.
When the complementary products are exclusive, the value increases in a device
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producers market share. The reason is that the more consumers that can buy a
product, the higher is the demand for a given R&D level. This creates a positive
relationship between the marginal revenue of R&D investments and the number
of consumers that can buy a product. Taken together, this implies that a device
producer can retrieve more revenues per captive consumer from the seller of com-
plementary products the more captive consumers it can o¤er the product seller.
When the products are non-exclusive, the sellers R&D investments in the com-
mon products are determined by its average prot margin from selling the products.
This reverses the relationship between revenue per consumer served and market
share. In order to see the intuition, suppose that one device producer has a large
customer base relative to the other producer. Then, most non-exclusive products
will be sold to the customers of the rst producer, such that the sellers average
prot margin will also be most sensitive to the prot margin it obtains when selling
products for the device which is owned by the most customers. Furthermore, the
device producer which has sold the most devices will also be the one which benets
the most when the consumers demand for complementary products increases due
to increased R&D. Taken together, this implies that it is optimal for a device pro-
ducer to charge a lower royalty fee and thus incentiveze the seller more strongly to
invest in R&D, the larger its market share. The ip-side is thus that the smaller the
market share a device producer has, the more it can free-ride on its rival promoting
high R&D investments. Thus, in equilibrium the device producer which has the
smallest market share charges the highest per-unit-sold royalty fee and makes the
most revenue per consumer.
Next we show that the there is a positive relationship between the surplus which
is competed away in the form of low device prices and the marginal revenue of
increasing the sales. Thus, since the marginal value of increasing the sales is highest
when the products are exclusive, most surplus is also competed away when the
products are exclusive. Furthermore, compared to when the products are exclusive,
less resources have to be spent on developing the complementary products when
they are non-exclusive. Thus, it is when the products are non-exclusive that most
surplus is generated. Both reasons contribute to the fact that the device producers
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make the highest prot when the products are non-exclusive.
Both when the complementary products are exclusive and non-exclusive, the
quality adjusted price that a consumer has to pay for complementary products is
decreasing in the number of consumers who own the same device as him. This
reinforces the utility boost which a consumer experiences when the price of a device
is reduced, inasmuch as a lower price means that more consumers will buy the device.
The fact that this is anticipated by the consumers strengthens the device producers
incentives to set low device prices in order to attract consumers. Interestingly, we
nd that the e¤ect is more pronounced when the device producers retrieve revenue
from the product seller by the use of two-part tari¤s than when they use per-unit-sold
royalty fees alone. The explanation is simply that it is most e¢ cient to retrieve rents
by two-part tari¤s. This implies that the quality-adjusted price for the products that
can be used on a given device becomes the most sensitive to the number of consumers
who own the device when two-part tari¤s are implantable. This intensies the
competition in the device market to such an extent that the device producers obtain
lowest prot when two-part tari¤s are implemented.
Next, we ask whether we will observe non-exclusive products and two-part tari¤s
in equilibrium. We nd that we will do so whenever it is technologically feasible
and the device producers are unable to commit to anything else. The explanation is
that a device producer is able to retrieve the largest share of rents when it employs
a two-part tari¤, and that there will be more rents when the products are non-
exclusive. Since product and contract type is determined after the consumers are
captured, there is no incentive for a device producer to choose anything else than
what maximizes its revenue at stage 2. Since these are non-exclusive products and
two-part tari¤s, this will be chosen whenever technologically feasible. Furthermore,
we show that these choices are also the choices that maximize social surplus.
Together the devices and the complementary products form (virtual) systems.
For an overview of literature on the economics of systems, see Katz & Shapiro
(1994). This literature has in particular focused on lock-in e¤ects (switching costs)
(see Klemperer (1987a) and Klemperer (1987b)), indirect network e¤ects/adoption
externalities, (see Chou & Shy (1990) and Church et al. (1993)), and network com-
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patibility, (see Katz & Shapiro (1985) and Farell & Saloner (1992)). In our model, a
consumers utility at stage 2 is a function of the number of consumers with whom he
is locked in together with (at stage 1). Thus, in our model, switching costs and net-
work e¤ects are present. Furthermore, we analyze the impacts of two extremes with
respect to "compatibility", i.e. exclusive and non-exclusive complementary prod-
ucts. In the systems literature, the supply of complementary products is usually
modeled like a "black box". We deviate from this, however, as we explicitly model
the actions of a strategic seller of complementary products. Among other things,
this approach allows us to show that adoption externalities may be brand specic
also when complementary products are non-exclusive, which, as far as we know, we
are the rst to show.
Our approach is borrowed from the literature of two-sided platforms. This liter-
ature studies industries/situations where heterogeneous groups, that impose exter-
nalities on each other, interact across one platform. Early papers of this literature
investigate how the prices should be set in order to internalize the externalities when
all groups arrive at the market simultaneously. See for instance Rochet & Tirole
(2003) or Caillaud & Jullien (2003). Hagiu (2006), however, deviates from the situ-
ation where agents from both groups arrive simultaneously. He considers a market
where there are both sellers and buyers, but where the sellers arrive rst. The timing
is motivated by the fact that sellers often need time to adjust the products before
the products can be used together with a given platform. We turn his timing up-
side-down. This we do in order to capture that most of the complementary products
that a consumer buys, he buys quite a long time after he bought the device. Despite
this, in spirit, Hagius paper is the paper which is closest to ours paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized into ve sections. The next section
describes the timing of the game and outlines its building blocks. In the third section
we derive how the seller of complementary products acts for di¤erent contracts and
for di¤erent product types, while in the fourth section we derive how the device
producers set device prices. In the fth section, we put together the ndings and
study how the interaction of contracts and product types a¤ects the competition in
the market for devices. The last section makes some concluding remarks.
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2 Timing of the game and some preliminaries
We assume that there is a unity mass of consumers who need a technological device
in order to derive utility from a class of products. These devices are sold by two
producers that compete a la Hotelling, i.e. producer 0 and producer 1 sell devices
that are horizontally di¤erentiated. The products, which are perfect complements
to the devices are sold by a monopolist. This rm is referred to as the product
seller or simply the seller. In some device industries, there are several rms that are
selling products for one device system. As long as a seller has a prot margin which
can be increased by R&D investments, the number of sellers has no implication for
our qualitative results. Thus, our choice of a monopoly seller is made in order to
simplify the algebra.
We impose the standard assumption that the consumers have unit demand (for
devices) and that the market for devices is covered in equilibrium. However, a
consumer demands multiple complementary products for his device. Finally we
assume that the devices are proprietary systems. Thus, in return for allowing the
seller to develop and sell products that are compatible with its the device system,
the device producer claims payments from the seller.
The timing of the game is as follows; at stage 1, the device producers sell devices
to the consumers. The product seller enters into contracts with the device producers
at stage 2. Since the consumers who are captured by a device producer represent
a valuable market for the seller, we assume that the device producers can dictate
the contract terms as long as the sellers participation constraint holds.1 When the
contracts are signed, the seller invests in R&D in order to develop the products.
The more the seller invests in developing a product, the higher marginal utility a
consumer obtains from consuming the product, all else equal. Finally, at the end of
stage 2, the consumers buy the products. The game is solved by backward induction.
1This may not be as unrealistic as it may sound. For instance, if there are more potential
sellers of complementary products for its device than what the device producer prefers, the device
producer will contract with only a subset of them, and that is the ones that o¤er the most favorable
contracts from the device producers point of view. Thus, if the outside option has a low value for
the sellers, the equilibrium will be as if the device producer could dictate the contract.
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We assume that the consumers have preferences over devices. However, the
utility which a consumer derives from consuming complementary products (on a
device) is assumed to be independent of his preferences with respect to devices.
Thus in our model, all consumers obtain the same utility from consuming a given
complementary product.2 In some device-based industries, the consumers have unit
demand for di¤erent product varieties. For instance, a consumer may buy several
video games, but he will never buy two copies of the same title. In order to capture
this type of unit demand, we assume that the seller supplies a range of di¤erent
product varieties, normalized to unity. Thus, a consumer can consume any number
of varieties in the interval [0; 1]. Let a consumers gross utility of consuming the
nth product variety be given by 1 + q   n , where q is the vertical quality of the
product variety. This quality is a function of the R&D investments, and we assume
that it is equal across all products that are sold for a device.3 If we now assume
that the demand can be approximated by a continuous variable n, the gross utility
of consuming n product varieties can be expressed as:
u =
Z n
0
(1 + q   n) dn = n(1 + q   n=2): (1)
Suppose now that the price of each product variety that is compatible with device
i is pi. If buying device i and consuming ni di¤erent varieties, a representative
consumers net utility from the complementary products is then:4
Ui = ui   nipi: (2)
By solving a representative consumers F.O.C. (@U=@p = 0), we obtain his demand
for product varieties as a function of the product price and the quality that he faces;
ni = 1 + qi   pi: (3)
2We assume that the preferences measure the utility from other properties of the devices, for
instance design.
3Decreasing marginal utility can for instance stem from the consumers buying the product
varieties they like the best rst.
4Note, if the nature of the product is such that a consumer buys the same variety several times,
ni can simply be interpreted as the number of times the product is bought.
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We assume that when the products are non-exclusive, there is a version for each
device. Thus, consumers who own di¤erent devices can be charged di¤erent prices.
This is in line with observations for instance from the video game market. Here
one and the same game title may be released in several versions in order to be
compatible with several consoles. Furthermore, the di¤erent versions are sometimes
sold at di¤erent prices, such that consumers with di¤erent console brands have to
pay di¤erent prices in order to play the same game. Total product demand from the
consumers who own a given device is therefore:
D0 = N0n0;
D1 = (1 N0)n1;
where ni is given by Eq. (3) and N0 is the number of consumers that own device
0. Since the number of consumers is normalized to unity and full market coverage
is assumed, N0 is also device producer 0s market share. The market share of
distributor 1 is consequently N1 = 1 N0.
At stage 2, each device producer o¤ers the seller a contract Ki = [Fi; fi] where
Fi  0 is a lump sum element and fi  0 is a per-unit-sold royalty fee. After the
contracts are signed, the product seller chooses the level of R&D investments. We
assume that if no R&D investments are made, the vertical quality of the comple-
mentary products is 1. Furthermore, if the seller invests q2i =2 in R&D, the vertical
quality of all product varieties compatible with device i is 1 + qi.5 Finally, we nor-
malize the marginal cost of all products to zero. Thus, if the product seller in total
invests C(q0; q1), its prot ( ) will be:
  =
1X
i=0
(pi   fi)Di   Fi   C(q0; q1). (4)
5In cases where the consumers have unit demand for di¤erent varieties, we assume that the
investments benet all varieties equally; for instance that a game developer builds up the capacity
to publish games with 3D technology. Alternatively, that the investments are spread equally across
the varieties, such that the vertical quality of each variety increases equally.
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The optimal price (pi ) of the product varieties that are compatible with device i is
given by the F.O.C. (@ =@pi = 0) By solving this we obtain :
p0 = (1 + q0 + f0) =2 (5)
p1 = (1 + q1 + f1) =2 (6)
If the products have to be tailored for each device, we assume that there is no
spillover in the R&D investments, i.e. C(q0; q1) = (q20 + q
2
1) =2. On the other hand,
if the products are non-exclusive, we assume that there is full spillover. Thus, by
investing C(q0; 0) = q20=2, products of quality 1 + q0 can be sold to all consumers,
regardless of which device they own. In order to avoid confusion, we denote the
non-exclusive products by q.6 By substituting into Eq. (4) for p0 and p

1 , and then
solving for the relevant F.O.C.(s), i.e. @ =@q0 = 0 = @ =@q1 when the products
are exclusive and @ =@q = 0 when the products are non-exclusive, we obtain the
quality levels. When the products are exclusive, this is:
qi =
Ni
2 Ni (1  fi) , (7)
where i = 0; 1. The quality of non-exclusive products is in contrast:
q = 1 N0f0   (1 N0)f1, (8)
We can now substitute for the equilibrium values p and q into Eq. (4), in order
to obtain the sellers prot as a function of the contracts it has entered into and the
device producersmarket shares. When the products are exclusive, this is:7
 E0;1 =
1X
i=0
 
1
2
Ni
(1  fi)2
2 Ni   Fi
!
: (9)
Note, it is possible that the seller will develop and sell products for only one device.
We therefore let the subscripts of   indicate which devices the seller serves. The
sellers prot when both device producers allow it to develop and sell non-exclusive
products is however:
6Since the products are non-exclusive, we assume that resources are spent on developing one set
of product varieties, and each of these is thereafter released in two versions, one for each device.
7Obviously, this is its prot also if only one device producer accepts non-exclusive products.
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 N =
1
2
(1  f1 (2  f1) +N0f0f1 (1 N0)) +
N0
4
(f1 (4  f1 (3 N0))  f0 (4  f0(1 +N0))) 
F0   F1:
3 Stage 2: Product sales
In the previous section we derived the sellers responses and prots, for the possible
combinations of contracts and product types, as functions of the device producers
market shares. Since the seller by assumption accepts all contracts for which the
participation condition holds, it will accept device producer 0s o¤er if  0;1   1 and
 0;1  0 hold simultaneously or  0 > 0 holds separately, and vice versa for device
producer 1.
At stage 2, device producer i will therefore choose the contract, from the set of
feasible contracts, which maximizes:
i = Nicifi + Fi, (10)
under the restrictions dened by the sellers participation constraint. Since we con-
sider two types of contracts, both for when the products are exclusive and non-
exclusive, we have in total four di¤erent cases:
Product / Contract Two-part tari¤ Linear fee
Exclusive E=T E=L
Non-Exclusive N=T N=L
Table 1; Product / Contract
In order to distinguish between the cases, we use the notation from Table 1 as
superscripts. Hence E=Ti is the revenue at stage 2 for device producer i when the
products are exclusive and revenues are retrieved by the use of two-part tari¤s. In
this case, a device producer can use the lump sum element to extract all the net
10
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revenues that the seller earns when it is given access to selling products for the
device system. Thus, a device producer will set the royalty fee to zero, in order
not to distort the sellers incentives with respect to pricing and investments. Device
producer is stage 2 revenue is therefore the rst term of Eq. (9). Furthermore, a
consumers net utility of consuming complementary products on the device system
is obtained by substituting into Eq. (2) for the equilibrium values pi and q

i . This
gives, respectively:

E=T
i =
1
2
Ni
2 Ni ,
U
E=T
i =
1
2
1
(2 Ni)2
.
If the complementary products are exclusive, but it is not possible for the device
producers to retrieve rents by lump-sum fees, a device producer will choose fi in
order to maximize:

E=L
i = Nicifi: (11)
By solving @E=Li =@fi = 0, we obtain:
f
E=L
i = 1=2.
We can now substitute fE=Li = 1=2 back into p

i and q

i and then substitute it all
back into a consumers utility and device producer is stage 2 revenue, which are
given by respectively Eq. (2) and Eq. (11). By doing so we obtain:

E=L
i =
1
4
Ni
2 Ni ,
U
E=L
i =
1
8
1
(2 Ni)2
.
If the complementary products are non-exclusive, we assume that the device
producers announce their respective contract o¤ers simultaneously. When two-part
tari¤s are implementable., the optimal lump sum in pure strategies is:
F i  Ni
 
1X
i=0
(pi   fi)Di   q2=2
!
: (12)
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Thus, the optimal lump sum fee equals the device producers market share multiplied
by the sellers total net revenue. In order to see that this has to be the optimal
lump sum, suppose that device producer j claims Fj = F j . For any fi, the sellers
participation constraint holds if Fi  F i and is violated if Fi > F i ; inasmuch as
the seller will obtain negative prot if it accepts one or both contracts in the latter
case.8 Hence, device producer i maximizes its prot by setting Fi = F i , given its
royalty fee fi. Thus, it is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies that both device
producers set fi such that they maximize their respective stage 2 revenues when
Fi = F
. By solving @N=Ti =@fi = 0 for fi under the constraint given by Eq. (12),
we obtain device producer is best response function:
fNNi = (1 Ni)
2  (1 Ni)fj
(1 +Ni) (2 Ni) . (13)
It follows from Eq. (13) that when Ni < 1 we have f
N=T
i  0 and @fN=Ti =@fj < 0.
Lemma 1: When two-part tari¤s are implementable. and the products are non-
exclusive;
a) the royalty fees are higher than when the products are exclusive, and;
b) the royalty fees are strategic substitutes.
The sellers marginal prot from R&D investments, and thus also the R&D
investments, are highest when the products are non-exclusive. The intuition is that
since all consumers are served with the same product varieties, the sales of a product
variety are highest when the products are non-exclusive, for a given quality level.
Hence, it is less necessary for a device producer to incentivize the seller to invest in
R&D by giving the seller a high prot margin. Furthermore, for a given per-unit-sold
royalty fee, the consumersdemand for complementary products is highest when the
products are non-exclusive. The device producers will internalize both e¤ects by
setting the highest per-unit-sold royalty fees when products are non-exclusive.
When a device producer sets a higher royalty fee, the seller responds by investing
less in R&D. This is due to the fact that the sellers R&D investments increase in
8See the appendix for details.
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its average prot margin. Hence, when a device producer claims a higher royalty
fee, a consumers willingness to pay decreases irrespective of which device he owns.
This makes it optimal for the other device producer to charge a lower royalty fee,
inasmuch as the consumers will respond to lower R&D investments by buying fewer
products, all else equal. Thus, when the products are non-exclusive, the royalty fees
are strategic substitutes.
By solving the system of the two best response functions, dened by Eq. (13),
we obtain the optimal royalty fees fN=T0 and f
N=T
1 :
f
N=T
i =
(1 Ni)
1 +Ni(1 Ni) : (14)
The equilibrium lump sums are then derived by substituting for the equilibrium
values into Eq. (12):9
F
N=T
i = Ni (2 Ni) (Ni + 1)
1  2Ni(1 Ni)
4 (1 +Ni(1 Ni))2
. (15)
It follows from Eq. (14) that, in contrast to when the products are exclusive, it is
optimal to set fi > 0 also when two-part tari¤s are implementable In order to see the
intuition, note that when the products are exclusive, a device producer retrieves by
the lump sum all the net revenue which the seller earns when it is given access to sell
products for the device. In contrast, when the products are non-exclusive, a device
producer retrieves a weighted share of the total net revenues that the seller makes.
Thus, when the products are non-exclusive, a device producer has, all else equal,
the weakest incentives to boost the net revenue of the seller by setting a low royalty
fee. Nonetheless, the larger the market share, the larger share of the net revenue a
device producer can retrieve by the lump sum. Thus, the larger the market share
a device produce has, the more it will rely on using the lump sum for retrieving
revenue from the seller, and as a consequence it will set a lower royalty fee in order
to boost the sellers net revenue. This is clear from Eq. (14) which shows that fi  0
if Ni  1. Nonetheless, since the device producers free-ride on each others e¤orts
to incentivize the seller to invest in R&D, a device producer which has a fairly small
9We drop the asterisk.
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market share will set fN=Ti > f
E=L
i = 1=2; even though it can now retrieve revenues
by the lump sum. By substituting the equilibrium values into a consumers utility
and device producer is stage 2 revenue, still given by respectively Eq. (2) and Eq.
(10), we obtain:

N=T
i = Ni (1 +Ni)
4 Ni(7 Ni(6  2Ni))
4 (1 +Ni(1 Ni))2
,
U
N=T
i =
1
2
N2i (Ni   2)2
(1 +Ni(1 Ni))2
.
If the complementary products are non-exclusive and only linear royalty fees can
be used to extract rents, a device producer will maximize Eq. (11). By solving the
system of F.O.C.s dened by @N=L0 =@f0 = 0 = @
N=L
1 =@f1 we obtain:
f
N=L
i =
2(3 Ni)
8 + 3Ni(1 Ni) . (16)
We can now compare the royalty fee when rents can be retrieved by two-part tari¤s
to when the rents can only be retrieved by per-unit-sold royalty fees, i.e. compare
Eq. (14) to Eq. (16). By doing this, we observe that a device producer which has
a large market share sets the highest royalty fee when it cannot use a lump sum,
and vice versa for a device producer which has a fairly small market share. The
explanation is that since a device producer cannot retrieve any of the sellers net
revenue without the use of a lump sum, it has no incentives to set a low royalty fee
with the aim of boosting the sellers net revenue. Thus, the device producer which
has the largest market share always sets highest royalty fee when two-part tari¤s are
not available. Inasmuch as this implies that the seller invests less in R&D, compared
to when two-part tari¤s are available, it also implies that the scope for free-riding
is smallest when two part tari¤s are not are not available. For the device producer
which has the smallest market share, a smaller scope for free-riding decreases its
incentive to set a high royalty fee. This e¤ect counters that a device producer, all
else equal, has incentives to set a higher royalty fee when it two-part tari¤s are not
available. Thus, if a device producer has a su¢ ciently small market share, it will
set the lowest royalty fee when two-part tari¤s are not available.10
10Recall that royalty fees are strategic substitues.
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If we now substitute for the equilibrium values into the stage 2 revenue for device
producer i and into the utility of a consumer who owns device i, we obtain:

N=L
i = (3 Ni)2
2Ni (1 +Ni)
(8 + 3Ni(1 Ni))2
,
U
N=L
i =
1
2
(3Ni + 1)
2 (Ni   2)2
(8 + 3Ni(1 Ni))2
.
In the gure below, we have plotted device producer is revenue at stage 2 as a
function of its market share, for all four cases. The solid lines are the revenue when
the device producers employ two-part tari¤s to shift rents from the seller,while the
dashed lines are the revenue when they employ only royalty fees. Furthermore, the
black lines are the revenue when the complementary products are exclusive, while
the grey lines are the revenue when the products are non-exclusive.
From Figure 1 we observe that the stage 2 revenue of a device producer always
increases in its market share. However, the type of contract and type of product
together determine the levels of revenue, and how sensitive the revenue is to a device
producers market shares.
Lemma 2: Around symmetric market shares, device producers stage 2 revenue;
15
SNF Working Paper No 40/12
a) increases most in its market share when two-part tari¤s are implementable.,
and;
b) is least sensitive to its market share when the products are non-exclusive.
A device producer receives most revenue from the seller, per consumer served,
when it can retrieve rents by two part tari¤s. Thus, all else equal, it is when two-
part tari¤s are available that a device producer increases its revenue most when it is
increasing its market share. When the complementary products are non-exclusive,
the device producers free-ride on each other with respect to inducing the seller to
invest in R&D. However, a device producer can free-ride less, the larger its market.
Thus, when products are non-exclusive, a device producers revenue from the seller
is least sensitive to its market share.
If we now plot the stage 2 utility of a device owner as a function of the number
of consumers that own the device, we obtain:
Lemma 3: In the neighborhood of symmetric market shares, the utility of owning
a given device;
a) increases most in the market share of the device when two-part tari¤s are
implementable., and;
b) is most sensitive to the market share of the device when the products are
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non-exclusive.11
When one more consumer buys a device, the utility of owning the device increases
most when two-part tari¤s are implementable. However, the mechanisms that lead
to this are di¤erent when the products are exclusive and non-exclusive. In the
former case, the R&D investments increase most in the market share of a device
when two-part tari¤s are implementable. Since higher R&D investments mean lower
quality-adjusted product prices, it follows that the utility increases most when only
per-unit-sold royalty fees are used by the device producers to retrieve rents.
When the products are non-exclusive however, the explanation is that the larger
market share a device producer has, the lower royalty fee it claims. This implies
that the version of the non-exclusive complementary products that are made for the
device which is owned by most consumers is the cheapest. Furthermore, the royalty
fee which a device producer charges decreases most in its share when two-part tari¤s
are implementable. This e¤ect in fact creates stronger adoption externalities than
what the quality e¤ect does when the products are exclusive. Thus, somewhat
surprisingly, the utility from consuming complementary products is most sensitive
to the device producersmarket shares when the products are non-exclusive.
It is interesting to note from Figure 2 that when two-part tari¤s are available, the
consumers are better o¤ when the products are exclusive than when they are non-
exclusive, and vice versa if solely per-unit sold royalty fees can be used for retrieving
rents. The explanation is that relative to exclusive products, non-exclusive products
have two opposing e¤ects on the quality-adjusted prices. All else equal, the seller
invests more in R&D when products are non-exclusive. This benets the consumers,
inasmuch as more R&D investments mean lower quality-adjusted product prices. On
the other hand, the device producers exploit this by charging the highest royalty fees
when the products are non-exclusive. This increases the quality-adjusted product
prices, all else equal. When two-part tari¤s are available, the e¤ect of higher per-
unit sold royalty fees dominates the e¤ect of more R&D investments. The quality
11When only linear royalty fees are implementable, this result holds if the market share increases
from less than 50% of the market .
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e¤ect dominates however when only per-unit sold royalty fees can be used to shift
rents.
In this section we have showed how the market share of a device producer impacts
the per consumer revenue which the device producer retrieves from the seller, and
the utility which a consumer obtains if it buys the device, i.e. we have derived the
network e¤ects. This is done for all four combinations of contract and product type.
In the next section we will derive how stage 2 network e¤ects in general a¤ect the
price of devices at stage 1.
4 Stage 1: Sales of devices
At this stage, the device producers compete for the consumers by selling devices. We
assume that the unity mass of consumers is uniformly distributed over a Hotelling
line (of length 1), where device producer 0 is located to the far left and device
producer 1 is located to the far right. A consumers location on the line determines
his preferences for the devices. The net utility for a consumer located at a point
x 2 [0; 1], before he consumes any complementary products is; v  xt if he buys the
device brand 0 and v (1  x) t if he buys the device brand 1. t is the transportation
costs parameter. In order to ensure that all consumers buy one and only one device
and to avoid local monopolies, we assume that v > t > t.12 Suppose now that Pi is
the price of device i, such that the consumers net utility of the two devices can be
expressed as:
V0(x) = U0 + v   xt  P0; (17)
V1(x) = U1 + v   (1  x)t  P1 (18)
A consumer chooses the device which gives him the highest net utility. However, as
shown in the previous section, the net utility of owning a device (Ui) is determined
by the market share of the device. When the consumers buy devices, the market
shares are obviously not yet determined. Thus, we assume that the consumers form
12If t < 0:962 22, then under some conditions we will have negative device prices. If v < t there
will be some conditions under which the market will not be covered.
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(correct) expectations about market shares, when they observe device prices and
have complete information about each others preferences. Suppose that for any
given pair of device prices, there exists a unique expectation 0  N0 (P0; P1)  1.
When this holds with equality, there exists a consumer who is indi¤erent between the
two devices. We dene the location of this consumer as x^. By setting V0(x^) = V1(x^)
and solving for x^, we obtain:
x^ =
1
2
+
UA(N

0 )  U1(N0 )  P0 + P1
2t
.
Since all consumers who are located to the left of this consumer will choose device 0,
we know that device producer 0s sales, and thus its market share, will be x^ = N0.
The market share of device 1 is then simply N1 = 1  x^.
We normalize the marginal cost of producing devices to zero. Furthermore, we
dene Ri(Ni) = i=Ni, such that Ri(Ni) is device producer is revenue from the
seller side per consumer served, when it serves Ni consumers. Thus, Ri can be
interpreted as a negative marginal cost. The prot expression of device producer i
then becomes:
i = Ni(Pi +Ri). (19)
The F.O.C. of device producer i (@i=@Pi = 0), with respect to its device price, can
now be expressed as:
@i
@Pi
= Ni +
dNi
dPi
(Pi +Ri) +
@Ri
@Ni
dNi
dPi
Ni = 0; (20)
where:
dNi
dPi
=   1
2t  @Ui
@Ni
+
@Uj
@Ni
< 0: (21)
Denition 1: If @Ui=@Ni 6= 0, there is a consumer level network e¤ect and if
Ri=@Ni 6= 0, there is a rm level network e¤ect.
Eq. (20) shows how device producer is prot changes if it increases the device
price marginally. The two rst terms of the equation capture the standard e¤ects
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of a price increase, i.e. higher mark-up but lower sales. The magnitude of the
sales decrease is given by Eq. (21). From this we can conclude that the smaller
t, and the stronger the positive consumer level network e¤ect, the more the sales
decrease.13 The former is straight forward, inasmuch as the consumers are less loyal
when t is low. The explanation for the network e¤ects impact is that the consumers
anticipate that the utility of owning the device is lower the higher the device price,
inasmuch as a higher price means a lower market share of the device.
The third term of Eq. (20) captures the e¤ect which a higher device price has
on the device producers revenue from the seller side. Since a higher price will lead
to less device sales, the sign on this e¤ect is determined by the sign on the rm level
network e¤ect, i.e. Ri=@Ni. Hence, compared to when @Ri=@Ni = 0, a positive rm
level network e¤ect (@Ri=@Ni > 0) decreases the marginal revenue of an increase in
the device price, while a negative rm level network e¤ect (@Ri=@Ni < 0) increases
the marginal revenue. The intuition is simply that when Ri=@Ni 6= 0, the marginal
consumer has an e¤ect on the revenue to which the inframarginal consumers con-
tribute. If this e¤ect is positive, it increases the loss of revenue associated with less
sales, and vice versa if the e¤ect is negative. We can therefore conclude that:
Lemma 4: The optimal device price is;
a) lower the more positive the consumer level network e¤ect is, and;
b) lower the more positive the rm level network e¤ect is, and vice versa when
the rm level network e¤ect is negative.
From Lemma 4 it follows that a consumer- and a rm level network e¤ect impact
the device producersbusiness stealing incentives in the same direction. Positive
e¤ects increase the incentives, and negative network e¤ects decrease them. The
underlying mechanisms are not equal however. A (positive) consumer level network
e¤ect impacts the business stealing incentive in the sense that it makes it less costly
to increase the market share. Hence, all else equal, the device price needs to be
reduced less in order to increase the sales with a given amount when there is a
13Due to the market coverage assumption jNij =   jNj j which implies that @Ui=@Ni will
always have the opposite sign of @Uj=@Ni.
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positive consumer level network e¤ect. The rm level network e¤ect impacts the
protability of increasing the market share. Thus, it is more protable to increase
the sales with a given amount when there is a positive rm level network e¤ect. We
can therefore sum up the discussion in a proposition:
Proposition 1: Compared to when there are no network e¤ects;
a) a positive consumer level network e¤ect makes the device sales more responsive
to a decrease in the device price, while;
b) a positive rm level network e¤ect makes it more protable to serve a large
market share, and vice versa when the rm level e¤ect is negative.
In the appendix we use Eqs (20) and (21) to show that the device price in the
symmetric equilibrium can be expressed as:14
Pi = t Ri  Ni

@Ri
@Ni
+
@Ui
@Ni
  @Uj
@Ni

(22)
As expected, Eq. (22) shows that the device price is higher the more loyal the
consumers are (higher t), and the less revenue the device producers receive from the
seller side per consumer served (lower R). The former is simply because the more
loyal the consumers are, the weaker is the incentive to reduce the device price in
order to attract consumers. The latter is due to the fact that the more revenues
that the device producers receive from the seller per consumer served, the stronger
their incentives are to reduce the device price in order to increase the sales.
The last term of Eq. (22) captures the impact of the network e¤ects, i.e. how the
device producers revenue per consumer served, and a consumerutility of owning
the devices, change as the market shares change. If the sum of this term is positive,
we can interpret it as a network e¤ect discount. Thus, inasmuch as the net adoption
externalities are positive, and these are internalized by the device producers, the
consumers are charged a low device price. On the other hand, if the term is negative,
14If the network e¤ects are very strong, one device producer will corner the market. However, if
the e¤ects are su¢ ciently weak such that no device producer can protably corner the market, it
seems reasonable to consider the symmetric equilibrium.
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the consumers are charged a higher device price due to the fact that the sum of
adoption externalities that are internalized by the device producers is negative. If
so, we can interpret it as a network e¤ect premium.
By substituting Eq. (22) back into Eq. (19) we obtain:
i =
t
2
  1
4

@Ri
@Ni
+
@Ui
@Ni
  @Uj
Ni

(23)
The last term of Eq. (23) shows that the larger the network e¤ect discount, the
lower the prot of the device producers. Hence, if the presence of a seller side
implies that the device producers have to o¤er network e¤ect discounts when they
compete for the consumers, the device producers would have been better o¤ if there
was no aftermarket associated to the devices (and they were still able to sell their
devices). This result applies irrespective of the magnitude of the revenue which can
be retrieved from the seller side.
An interesting implication of this is that it may not necessarily be protable for
an industry as a whole that a product category becomes a sales platform for other
products and services, mobile phones may serve as an example. This may be so
despite the fact that the device producers are gaining a new source of revenue and
a likely increase in the consumersvaluation of their products. Hence, if there are
network e¤ects associated to the market for smart phone applications, the hand-
set producersprot may actually decrease when such applications become more
important to the consumers.
Having said that, it will of course always be privately optimal for a producer to
develop a well-functioning application market for its handsets. Thus, the result can
be a prisoners dilemma situation. All device producers do their best to increase the
revenues from the seller side, but the result is intensied competition in the device
market and lower prot for the device producers.
Proposition 2: Compared to a device type where there is no aftermarket for
complementary products, the prot prospective of an industry with an aftermarket
is;
a) lower if the aftermarket creates positive network e¤ects, and;
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b) higher if the aftermarket creates negative network e¤ects.
In this section we have analyzed how network e¤ects in general impact the com-
petition for the consumers in device markets. In the next section we will look at this
together with the results from the third section, in order to analyze how contract
types (linear royalty fee/two-part tari¤) and product types (exclusive/non-exclusive)
are likely to a¤ect the competition for consumers when the seller can increase the
value of its products by R&D investments.
5 The competitive e¤ects of product and contract
types
From Eq. (23) we know that the more positive the sum of the consumer- and
the rm level network e¤ect is in the neighborhood of symmetric market shares,
the tougher is the competition and the lower the prot of the device producers.
Furthermore, this result applies regardless of the magnitude of the revenue which
the device producers collect from the seller side. Hence, by evaluating the network
e¤ects in the neighbourhood of symmetric market shares, we can infer how the
product and contract types a¤ect the device producersprot.
In the appendix we show that the consumer level network e¤ects, in the neigh-
bourhood of symmetric of market shares, can be ranked as follows:15
0 <
@U
N=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
<
@U
E=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
<
@U
E=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
<
@U
N=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
: (24)
The consumers responsiveness to a decrease in a device price is determined
by the strength of the consumer level network e¤ect. Inequality (24) shows how
product types and contract types a¤ect the consumer level network e¤ect. Thus,
from this inequality, we can deduce how responsive the consumers are to a price
15Our aim is not to derive the exact prices, but to analyze the qualitative e¤ects that di¤erent
contract types and product types may have on the competition. We consider the e¤ects in the
neighbourhood of symmetric market shares to be approximations for the e¤ects we are interested
in.
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decrease. As expected, we observe that the consumer level network e¤ects are most
pronounced when two-part tari¤s are available. We can therefore conclude that
when only linear royalty fees can be used to retrieve revenue from the seller side,
then the device price has to be reduced the most in order to increase the sales by a
given amount. Furthermore, when two-part tari¤s are available, the consumers will
be most sensitive to device price di¤erences when the products are non-exclusive.
It is, however, the other way around when the device producers can use only linear
royalty fees. Then the consumers are least sensitive to di¤erences in prices when the
products are non-exclusive.
The ranking of the rm level network e¤ect is in the appendix shown to be as
follows:
@R
N=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
<
@R
N=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
< 0 <
@R
E=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
<
@R
E=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
: (25)
Inequality (25) shows how the per consumer revenue that a device producer retrieves
from the seller changes if the device producer increases its market share marginally.
From the inequality we observe that the per consumer revenue decreases if the
products are non-exclusive, and increases vice versa if the products are exclusive.
Thus, the rm level network e¤ects are diametrically di¤erent for the two product
types. The explanation is that when the products are exclusive, the seller will
respond by increasing R&D investments when the market share of a device increases.
This implies that there is more revenue to be shared between the device producer
and the seller at stage 2. When the products are non-exclusive, however, it is the
other way around. A device producer which increases its market share will to a
lesser degree be able to free-ride on its rival. Thus, after having increased its market
share, a device producer chooses to provide the seller with a higher prot margin in
order to induce the seller to more eagerly invest in R&D (for the common products).
Compared to when only linear royalty fees can be implemented, the e¤ects are
reinforced when two-part tari¤s are implementable. The explanation is simply that
retrieving revenues by two-part tari¤s is the most e¢ cient method. It allows a device
producer to retrieve a larger share of the sellers total revenues, while distorting the
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sellers incentives to a smaller degree than linear royalty fees only. Thus, when
the products are exclusive, the option of retrieving rents by a lump sum increases
the value to a device producer of serving a large market. When the products are
non-exclusive however, the option increases the value of being a free-rider.
In the appendix we show that if we substitute for the marginal e¤ects into Eq.
(23), the prot of a device producer can be ranked as follows16:
E=T < N=T < E=L < N=L: (26)
Proposition 3: The prot of a device producer is higher;
a) when the products are non-exclusive, compared to when they are exclusive,
and;
b) when revenue from the seller is retrieved only by royalty fees, compared to
when two-part tari¤s are employed.
Since tougher competition means lower equilibrium prot, we can use inequality
(26) to draw some conclusions about how di¤erent characteristics of device markets
a¤ect the competition. First, we observe that the prot is higher when the products
are non-exclusive than when the products are exclusive, all else equal. This is
also true when two-part tari¤s are implementable. Thus, we can conclude that the
softening e¤ect on the competition from the fact that non-exclusive products make
it less protable to serve large market shares dominates the intensifying e¤ect on
the competition due to the fact that non-exclusive products make the consumers
more concerned about the popularity of the devices.
The prots of the device producers are always lowest when two-part tari¤s are
implemented. This may sound counterintuitive inasmuch as the device producers
always retrieve most revenue from the seller when the two-part tari¤s are imple-
mented. However it is exactly because two-part tari¤s are so e¢ cient in retrieving
revenues from the seller side that they hurt the device producers. Two-part tari¤s
create the strongest adoption externalities, and, thus, the strongest network e¤ect
discounts.
16Since all equilibria are symmetric, we drop the subscript.
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We can now study how the consumers are a¤ected by the combination of product
and contract types. Since all equilibria are symmetric and there is a unity mass of
consumers, the consumer surplus is given by CS = U + v   t=4  P .17
CSE=L < CSN=L < CSN=T < CSE=T : (27)
Lemma 5: The consumers always obtain highest utility when the device produc-
ers can retrieve revenue by two-part tari¤s, and they prefer;
a) non-exclusive products to exclusive products, when the seller pays only linear
royalty fees, and;
b) exclusive products to non-exclusive products, when the seller has to pay lump
sums as well to the device producers.
The consumers are always better o¤when the device producers retrieve rents by
two-part tari¤s than when they only use royalty fees. The intuition is that two-part
tari¤s, due to no or low royalty fees, distort the sellers pricing and investments
incentives to the lowest degree. This benets the consumers in the form of low
quality-adjusted product prices, but also in the form of low device prices. The
former is because the royalty fees are lowest when two-part tari¤s are employed,
and the latter due to the fact that two-part tari¤s intensify the competition in the
device market.
If the device producers retrieve revenue from the seller by two-part tari¤s, the
consumers benet from the products being exclusive. However, if only per-unit-
sold royalty fees are used, the consumers are better o¤ when the products are
non-exclusive. The explanation is that when the products are non-exclusive, the
seller invest more in R&D. Thus, the consumers obtain higher utility from the non-
exclusive products than from the exclusive products. The ip side is that they also
have to pay more, both for devices and for complementary products. When rents
are retrieved by per-unit sold royalty fees only, the positive R&D e¤ect dominates
such that the consumersutility is highest when the products are non-exclusive. The
17The average transportation cost is t=4:
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e¤ect of higher prices dominates, however, when revenue from the seller is retrieved
by two-part tari¤s, such that the consumersutility is then lower when the products
are non-exclusive than when they are exclusive.
The social surplus is given by SS =
P
i i+CS+ : In the appendix we substitute
into this expression and derive the following ranking:
SSE=L < SSN=L < SSE=T < SSN=T (28)
For any given contract type, the social surplus is highest when the products are non-
exclusive. This implies that the positive scale e¤ect in the R&D investments caused
by the products being non-exclusive, dominates the e¢ ciency gain from the fact that
royalty fees are lowest when the products are exclusive. Furthermore, we observe
that the social surplus is always highest when two-part tari¤s are implementable.
The explanation is simply that a two-part tari¤ is the most e¢ cient instrument by
which revenue can be retrieved.
Suppose now that we are at stage 2, i.e. that the consumers are captured. Since
the seller, all else equal, invests more in the products when the products are non-
exclusive, both device producers will at this stage be better o¤when the products are
non-exclusive than when they are exclusive. In the appendix we show that also the
seller is (weakly) better o¤ when it is selling non-exclusive products. Thus, at stage
2, no rm has any interest in promoting exclusive products. We therefore conclude
that the products will be non-exclusive whenever this is technologically feasible.
Since this is anticipated by the active agents at stage 1, both the consumers and the
device producers take it into account when they make their decisions at this stage.
In other words, from the set of feasible products, the product type which occurs in
equilibrium will the the socially e¢ cient one.18
We can do the same analysis for contract types. Here, our results suggest that
both the device producers and the seller prefer that two-part tari¤s are not em-
ployed. However, since the device producers choose the contracts by which they
should retrieve revenues from the seller at stage 2, it is at this stage that it is deter-
mined whether or not two-part tari¤s will be employed in equilibrium. When the
18Non-exclusive products may for instance be restricted by technological conditions.
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consumers are captured, the coalition of the seller and a device producer maximizes
total revenue exactly by the use of two-part tari¤s. Thus, at stage 2, both parties
of a coalition can be made better o¤ if two-part tari¤s are employed, relative to
when solely per-unit sold royalty fees are used. We can therefore conclude that
whenever two-part tari¤s are feasible, the device producers will charge the sellers
lump sums. Again, this will be anticipated by the active agents at stage 1, and they
will therefore take this into account. Hence, from the set of technologically feasible
contracts, the socially most e¢ cient contract occurs in equilibrium. In other words,
if, in an industry which shares properties with the industry analyzed in this paper,
we observe that the products are exclusive and that rents are retrieved by royalty
fees only, we should not expect that non-exclusive products and two-part tari¤s are
not technologically feasible.
Proposition 4: In a consumption device market where the seller can increase
the value of its products by R&D investments, the social surplus for the feasible
technologies is maximized without intervention from a social planner.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed an industry where competing rms sell products
which are (primarily) bought because they enable for consumption of complementary
products. We refer to these products as consumption devices and examples may be
co¤ee machines, tablet computers and video game consoles. Device-based industries
di¤er, however, with respect to whether the same complementary products can be
sold for several devices or the products have to be tailored for each device. For
instance, the more advanced the technologies are, the more di¢ cult it might be to
make the same applications run at di¤erent devices. Conditions at the seller side
may also determine which instruments the device producers may employ to extract
revenue from the sellers. For instance, since video games are more advanced than
most smart phone applications, it might be easier to develop non-exclusive smart
phone applications than video games. Furthermore, since the video game developers
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are large professional organizations, it might be easier to charge up-front payments
from them than from individuals who develop smart phone applications as a hobby.
This is the starting point of our study which aims at analyzing how such di¤erences
a¤ect the competition in the device market.
We show that relative to exclusive products, non-exclusive products have a soft-
ening e¤ect on the competition in the device market. The explanation is that when
the products are exclusive, the seller will create "better" products for a device, i.e.
invest more in R&D, the more consumers that own the device. This is benecial to
the consumers as well as to the coalition consisting of the seller and the device pro-
ducer, which creates erce competition to capture consumers. However, when the
products are non-exclusive, the device producers have weaker incentives to capture
large market shares. This is due to the fact that they can free-ride on each other
when it comes to inducing the product seller to invest in R&D. Furthermore, we
show that when rents can be extracted from the seller side by two-part tari¤s, the
competition in the device market is tougher relative to when revenue can only be
retrieved by linear royalty fees. Roughly speaking, we can say that it is the fact that
royalty fees create ine¢ ciencies that decreases the positive adoption externalities,
which in turn soften the competition in the device market. The more the product
sellers incentives will be distorted by royalty fees, the less a device producer gains
from capturing one more consumer and the less sensitive the quality-adjusted price
of complementary products is to the market shares of the devices.
Relative to when the products are exclusive, the social surplus is higher when
the products are non-exclusive. Furthermore, for given product types, the social
surplus is always highest when two-part tari¤s are employed to extract revenues
from the seller side. An interesting nding is that due to the rmsincentives, it
is not necessary for a social planner to intervene in the market in order to achieve
the socially best solution. The explanation is that after the consumers have been
captured, it is in the interest of all rms that the products are non-exclusive. The
same argument applies to why two-part tari¤s will always be employed when it
is technologically feasible. After the consumers have been captured, it is always
optimal to employ two-part tari¤s. This will be anticipated by both consumers and
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device producers. Thus, if two-part tari¤s are technologically feasible, these will
always occur in equilibrium.
Even though the industry maximizes (the feasible) social surplus, consumer sur-
plus is not always maximized. When the products are exclusive, the competition for
the consumers is toughest. From the consumerspoint of view, lower device prices
when the products are exclusive dominate over the quality-adjusted complementary
product prices being lower when the products are non-exclusive. Hence, the con-
sumers prefer exclusive products to non-exclusive products when two-part tari¤s
are feasible. It is the other way around, however, when linear fees are employed to
extract revenue from the consumer side.
Our results may explain why Corts & Lederman (2009) nd an increasing number
of non-exclusive game titles in the video game industry. Furthermore, since Evans et
al., 2006, report that linear royalty fees are the main instrument for rent extraction
in the video game industry, our results indicate that this development should be
welcomed by the consumers. It therefore seems like the Federal Trade Commission
did consumers a favour when in 1987 they forced Nintendo to drop an exclusivity
clause from its standard contract with game developers. On the other hand, our
results suggest that Nintendo would probably have done so in any case when non-
exclusive products became technologically feasible.
Some words about a couple of our assumptions. The driving mechanism of our
results is that the seller of complementary products can invest in R&D in order to
increase the prot margin of its products. Inasmuch as technological devices are
often used to consume information goods that are produced at a very low marginal
cost, we have modeled the R&D investments as investments in product quality. It
should be noted, however, that all results are analogous if the seller of complementary
products can decrease its marginal costs by investing in R&D.
We also assume that there is only one active seller of complementary products
at each point of time. This may seem like a restrictive assumption, since we for
instance observe that there are many rms that sell games for each video game
console. However, the crucial property we aim to capture is that the seller has a
prot margin, which can be increased by R&D investments. Thus, as long as this
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holds, the number of sellers should have no implications for our qualitative results.
7 Appendix
Appendix A1: Optimal lump sum when products are non-exclusive.
Suppose that the device producers try to capture their incremental contribution:
If the seller accepts the contract of device producer 1 it will obtain:
 1 =
1
2
(1 N0) (1  f1)
2
2  (1 N0)   F1;
so it will accept a contract o¤ered by device producer 0 if  0;1    1 > 0 which van
be expressed as:
1
2
(1  f1 (2  f1) +N0f0f1 (1 N0)) +
N0
4
(f1 (4  f1 (3 N0))  f0 (4  f0(1 +N0)))  F0   F1    E1 > 0 (29)
by solving this for F0 we obtain:
F0 =
1
4
N0
(f0 + f1 +N0f0  N0f1   2)2
N0 + 1
(30)
When device producer 0 tries to appropriate its incremental contribution it will
maximize 0 = n0f0N0 + F0 for f0, under the restriction that F0 is given by Eq.
(30). This gives:
f0 =
1
1 N0 (3f0  N0f0)
However, as distributor 1 will do the same, we have that:
f1 =
1
1  (1 N0) (3f1   (1 N0)f1)
By solving the two best response functions we obtain:
f0 = f1 = 0
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Due to symmetry, we know that:
F1 =
1
4
(1 N0)(f0 + f1 + (1 N0)f1   (1 N0)f0   2)
2
N0 + 1
By substituting it all back into  N we obtain:
 0;1 =  1
2
1 N0
1 +N0
< 0
and by substituting back into  0 and  1 we obtain:
 0 =  3
2
N0
1 N0
N0  N20 + 2
< 0
 1 =  1
2
1 N0
N0 + 1
< 0
Hence, the device producers cannot capture their incremental contribution, since if
they both try to do this, the seller will accept none of the contracts. Q.E.D.
Appendix A2: Deriving demand elasticity for devices
The expression for the indi¤erent consumer is:
x^ =
1
2
+
UA(x^)  UB(x^)  PA + PB
2t
(31)
If we di¤erentiate equation (31) with respect to Pi, we obtain:
dNi
dPi
=
1
2t

 1 +

@Ui
@Ni
  @Ui
@Ni

dNi
dPi

(32)
By solving equation (32) for dNi=dPi we obtain:
dNi
dPi
=   1
2t  @ui
@Ni
+
@uj
@Ni
Q.E.D.
Appendix A3: Deriving device price for the symmetric equilibrium
For convenience, we write equation (20) below:
@i
@Pi
= Ni +
dNi
dPi
(Pi +Ri) +
@Ri
@Ni
dNi
dPi
Ni = 0
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This can be rewritten as:
 dNi
dPi
Pi = Ni +
dNi
dPi
Ri +
@Ri
@Ni
dNi
dPi
Ni
Pi =

 dNi
dPi
 1
Ni  Ri   @Ri
@Ni
Ni
Pi =

2t  @Ui
@Ni
+
@Uj
@Ni

Ni  Ri   @Ri
@Ni
Ni
Pi =

2t  @Ui
@Ni
+
@Uj
@Ni

Ni  Ri   @Ri
@Ni
Ni
Pi = 2tNi  Ri  Ni

@Ri
@Ni
+
@Ui
@Ni
  @Uj
@Ni

where Ni = x^ and Pj is given by a symmetric expression.
Since Ri,@Ri=@Ni and @Ui=@Ni are functions of Ni we have a system of two
equations and three unknowns. This cannot be solved, but since we are interested
in the symmetric market shares, we can evaluate the expressions for Ni = 1=2. By
doing so, it follows immediately that Pi is given by equation (22).
The prot is given by total revenues per device sold times the number of devices
sold, i.e.  = (Pi +Ri)Ni. If we evaluate this for Ni = Nj = 1=2 we obtain Eq
(23). Q.E.D.
Appendix A4: Calibrating the adoption externalities that determine
the consumersdemand
The expressions for the utility of consuming complementary products at device
i are:
U
E=T
i =
1
2
1
(2 Ni)2
U
E=L
i =
1
8
1
(2 Ni)2
U
N=T
i =
1
2
N2i (Ni   2)2
(1 +Ni(1 Ni))2
U
N=L
i =
1
2
(3Ni + 1)
2 (Ni   2)2
(8 + 3Ni(1 Ni))2
If we take derivatives with respect to Ni and then evaluate the expressions for
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Ni = 1=2 we obtain:
@U
E=T
i
@Ni
=   1
(Ni   2)3
=) @U
E=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 0:296 30
@U
E=L
i
@Ni
=   1
4 (Ni   2)3
=) @U
E=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 7: 407 4 10 2
@U
N=T
i
@Ni
= Ni (Ni   2)  2Ni +N
2
i + 2
( Ni +N2i   1)3
=) @U
N=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 0:48
@U
N=L
i
@Ni
= (N1   3) (N1 + 1) 2N1 + 3N
2
1 + 7
( 3N1 + 3N21   8)3
=) @U
N=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 4: 898 0 10 2
Q.E.D.
Appendix A5: Calibrating the adoption externalities that determine
the per consumer served revenue for the device producers
The expressions for the stage 2 revenues per consumer (Ri = i=Ni) are:
R
E=T
i =
1
2
1
2 Ni =) R
E=T
ijNi=0:5
= 0:333 33
R
E=L
i =
1
4
1
2 Ni =) R
E=L
ijNi=0:5
= 0:166 67
R
N=T
i = (1 +Ni)
4 Ni(7 Ni(6  2Ni))
4 (1 +Ni(1 Ni))2
=) RN=TijNi=0:5 = 0:42
R
N=L
i = (3 Ni)2
2 (1 +Ni)
(8 + 3Ni(1 Ni))2
=) RN=LijNi=0:5 = 0:244 90
If we take derivatives with respect to Ni and then evaluate the expressions for
Ni = 1=2 we obtain:
@R
E=T
i
@Ni
=
1
2 (Ni   2)2
=) @R
E=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 0:222 22
@R
E=L
i
@Ni
=
1
4 (Ni   2)2
=) @R
E=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
= 0:111 11
@R
N=T
i
@Ni
=  1
4
 17Ni   3N2i + 6N3i + 11
(Ni  N2i + 1)3
=) @R
N=T
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
=  0:32
@R
N=L
i
@Ni
=  2 (3 Ni) 10  3Ni (1 + 6Ni  N
2
i )
(8 + 3Ni(1 Ni))3
=) @R
N=L
i
@Ni jNi=1=2
=  3: 265 3 10 2
Q.E.D.
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Appendix A6: Equilibrium values (Symmetric equilibrium)
When one device producer increases its market share, the stage 2 utility of both
devices changes. Since we focus on e¤ect around symmetric markets shares we know
that change in the di¤erence must be @Ui=@Ni   @Uj=@Ni = 2(@Ui=@Ni) = @@Ni
We can now nd the equilibrium prices by substituting into the Eq. (22) for the
respective expressions,@=@Ni and Ri;=@Ni and Ri, all evaluated for the symmetric
equilibrium. This gives:
P
E=T
i = t  0:740 74
P
E=L
i = t  0:296 30
P
N=T
i = t  0:74
P
;N=L
i = t  0:277 55
The equilibrium prot for the device producers is;  =

PjNi=1=2 +RjNi=1=2

NijNi=1=2
,
which gives:
E=T = t=2  0:203 71
E=L = t=2  0:064 82
N=T = t=2  0:16
N=L = t=2  1: 632 5 10 2
The net utility of buying a device is determined by v, Ui, P and xit where the
last element is constant for all cases, but varies over the consumers. However, the
transportation costs for a given consumer is equal across all cases. By substituting
into Eq. (2) for the average consumer, we obtain:
CS
;E=T
ijNi=0:5
= v   t+ 0:962 96  t=4
CS
E=L
ijNi=0:5
= v   t+ 0:351 86  t=4
CS
N=T
ijNi=0:5
= v   t+ 0:92  t=4
CS
N=L
ijNi=0:5
= v   t+ 0:369 39  t=4
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The prot of the seller of complementary products is ( ):
 E=T = 0
 E=L = 8: 333 4 10 2
 N=T = 0
 N=L = 9: 183 7 10 2
The social surplus is given by the sum of the prot of the device producers,
(), the prot of the seller of complementary products ( ) and the total consumer
surplus. Since there are a unity mass of consumers, we can therefore write+ +CS,
this gives:
SSE=T = v   1
4
t+ 0:555 55
SSE=L = v   1
4
t+ 0:305 55
SSN=T = v   1
4
t+ 0:6
SSN=L = v   1
4
t+ 0:428 58
Q.E.D.
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Some products and services are perfect complements to technological devices, 
such as video games to video game consoles. We analyze how competition between 
two firms selling such devices is affected by the fact that they can retrieve revenue 
both from end-users and from firms selling complementary products. We show that 
non-exclusive complementary products weaken competition relative to when the 
products are exclusive. Furthermore, competition is less keen when the device producers 
have inefficient means for retrieving revenue from the seller side, compared to when 
they have efficient means. Finally, we show that from the set of feasible strategies, 
the firms will always choose the socially optimal one. A novel finding is that at the 
consumer side there are brand specific adoption externalities also when the 
complementary products are non-exclusive.
